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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
E. J. TAYLOR
Baird as Receiver v. Goforth: A state bank failed and at time
of closing its doors held note of defendant. On suit being brought
by the receiver to enforce payment of said note, defendant claimed
there was a conditional delivery of the same. He claimed it was a
renewal note and that the original note or notes were to have been
returned to him but never were. The case was tried to the court
without a jury. The trial court held that the defense interposed by
the defendant had not been sustained. HELD: That on appeal from
a judgment rendered in an action properly triable to a jury, but tried
to the court Without a jury the findings of fact are presumed to be
correct; and where such findings are based on parol evidence, they
will not be disturbed unless clearly shown to be opposed to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
0
Erickson v. State Fair Association: Defendant, a domestic cor-
poration, advertised a horse race to be run at state fair and offered
purse to winner. Plaintiff entered his horse to run in race, paid
entrance fee and took his horse to Fargo to contend. Defendant re-
fused to have race run 'although there were several entries and
tendered a return of entrance fee. Plaintiff claims damages on ac-
count of refusal of defendant to have race run. HELD: Horse
racing is within prohibition of Sec. 9688 C. L. 1913 which forbids
"all racing or trial of speed -between horses or (other) animals for
any bet, stake or reward." A contract to do an act forbidden by
express provision of the law-is illegal and unenforcable. Courts
will not aid parties engaged in illegal transactions.
0
State ex rel Thompson & Wife v. Olsness as Insurance Com-
missioner: Plaintiffs owned 48o acres of agricultural land in Ramsey
county. During 1924 they planted 350 acres to crop. The land was
listed by assessor for hail insurance as required by law. Plaintiffs
desired that land be withdrawn from protection. Each depended
on the other to make withdrawal which was not done. In December
they learned that their land had not been withdrawn and paid
tax. They then notified Insurance Commissioner that they had sus-
tained a loo% loss by hail on July 22nd preceding and demanded an
adjustment. Insurance Commissioner refused same. HELD: The
duty of presenting claims for losses payable out of the State Hail
Insurance Fund devolves upon those sustaining losses, and where
claimants neglect to present claims until after the indemnity levy is
made for a particular year (25th of October, Sec. 6, C. 232, Laws of
1923, Sec. 7, C. 77, Laws 1921) the state hail insurance commissioner
may not be compelled by mandamus to adjust such claims.
Lesch v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank: Defendant is a
banking corporation organized under the- laws of this state. Plaintiff
purchased certain K. N. K. travelers' checks from defendant, whose
cashier assured him that said checks were good and the banking firm
issuing same was solvent. Relying on such assurance he purchased
the checks which proved worthless. Plaintiff brings action against
defendant bank for amount of the checks so purchased. HELD:
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Jury was justified in finding that the representations made by de-
fendant bank were statements of fact and not mere expressions of
opinions. Jury found for plaintiff.
0
Howland v. Bailey: Defendant owed plaintiff $3,757, evidenced
by note for that amount, secured by two mortgages on different tracts
of land, and given on different dates. Each mortgage showed that it
was to secure full amount. Mortgages were foreclosed and sheriff's
certificates of sale issued. Each showed that the tracts of land were
both sold for full amount of debt. Mortgagee refused to accept the cer-
tificate and new ones were issued by sheriff for correct amount. Trial
court held that original certificates were valid and that deeds might
be issued thereon. Plaintiff brought action to quiet title in himself.
Defendant claims debt satisfied by sale of one tract. HELD: That
defendant may redeem from either or both sales within one year.
Amount required to redeem from either mortgage shall be in pro-
portion to the value of all land mortgaged and described in both
mortgages.
Divide County v. Baird as Receiver of First State Bank of Wild
Rose, et al: Plaintiff county, through its board of County Commis-
sioners, in July, 1923, designated defendant bank as a depository of
its funds and made a deposit of county funds therein. The bank
furnished a personal bond to protect the deposit and in addition thereto
pledged certificates of indebtedness of municipalities with Divide
County as collateral security for the deposit. Some time after the
deposit was made the bank became insolvent and appellant Baird as
Receiver in due time took charge of its affairs. Demand was made
for repayment of deposit which was not complied with. Proceedings
were begun to recover same and to foreclose pledges. The trial
court held that as bank and its sureties had neither complied with
demand to return money nor tendered a return thereof the receiver
and sureties were estopped from questioning the regularity of the
pledge. HELD: That the plaintiff has no right to foreclose the
pledge or retain the assets which the bank attempted to hypothecate.
0
Boynton, et al v. Board of City Commissioners of Minot: In 1926
the City of Minot proposed to pave certain of its streets. On June
21st an ordinance was introduced creating improvement districts and
passed on first reading. At same meeting plans, specifications and
engineer's estimates were ordered. Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin
further proceedings on grounds that improvement district was not
created prior to proceeding to advertise for bids and because the
contracts proposed to be let did not conform to plans and specifica-
tions as bled on which notice for proposals were predicated. Trial
court held with defendants and plaintiffs appeal. HELD: The crea-
tion of the improvement district is jurisdictional. A city has no
authority to provide for a special improvement until it has created a
special improvement district.
0
Blank v. Fenton as Administrator: The lessee of a cropper's con-
tract, who threshes the grain raised in accordance with the terms of
the contract, is entitled to a thresher's lien on all of the grain to be
raised, irrespective of any contract between his landlord and others to
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which the lessee is not a party and does not waive his lien by deliver-
ing the grain at an elevator as required by his contract, even though
this results in a commingling of grain.
0
Kutchera v. Soo Railway Company: In an action for damages
for personal injuries, the complaint charged that the plaintiff had
been employed to repair a gasoline engine belonging to a railway
speeder, which was a dangerous and treacherous machine to operate
owing to the fact that it would, without warning, jump off the rails,
and it is alleged that the defendant gave to the plaintiff authority to
test the engine by operating the speeder upon its tracks; that the
dangerous character of the instrumentality was known to the defend-
ant and unknown to the plaintiff and that the defendant neglected to
give to the plaintiff notice of such danger. It is further alleged that,
while operating the speeder in the usual manner upon the tracks of
the defendant, it jumped the track causing injuries complained of.
HELD: (i) An admission of a station agent a number of days after
the accident to the effect that he expected that something might hap-
pen because the car had jumped the track before is not admissible
against the defendant to prove negligence, because (a) It is not a
part of the res gestae; (b) It is not shown that the agent had author-
ity to bind the principal in the matter concerning which the admission
was made. (2) Upon an issue of the knowledge of a particular
person at a given time, an extrajudicial declaration of such person
at a subsequent time, which affords no evidence of his prior state of
knowledge aside from the truth of the declaration is inadmissible as
hearsay.
